About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 39 – The Un-ratified Amendment Proposed on August 22, 1978 – District of Columbia Representation
By David Robert Wood
August 1, 2012

This proposed Amendment to the Constitution would have provided representation in Congress for the seat of the federal Government, i.e., Washington DC, the District of Columbia. It would also have provided electors for President and Vice President, like provided for the States, and would have repealed Article of Amendment XXIII, which now provides electors for President and Vice President in a slightly different manner. Following is the original text of this proposed Amendment — “Article—”:

Section 1. For purposes of representation in the Congress, election of the President and Vice President, and article V of this Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall be treated as though it were a State.

Section 2. The exercise of the rights and powers conferred under this article shall be by he people of the District constituting the seat of government, and as shall be provided by the Congress.

Section 3. The twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section 4. This article shall be inoperative, unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

The August 22, 1978, proposed Amendment on “District of Columbia Representation,” has not been ratified by the requisite number of States. It expired on August 29, 1985, as prescribed in the text of the proposed Amendment and in the Joint Resolution proposing it, and is no longer subject to State ratification.

This Amendment was proposed in the second session of the ninety-fifth Congress, by a Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 554) on August 22, 1978, when it passed the Senate by a vote of 67 to 32. It had previously passed the House of Representatives on March 2, 1978, by a vote of 289 to 127. It was originally introduced in the House of Representatives on July 12, 1977, by Guy Vander Jagt from Michigan.

Following its passage, this Amendment was certified as proposed on August 30, 1978, by the Director of the Federal Register, Fred J. Emery. It was then transmitted to the fifty States for ratification consideration by the Administrator of General Services, Jay Solomon, on August 30, 1978.

In both the text of the proposed Amendment and in the congressional resolution proposing it, Congress prescribed a seven-year time limit, or drop-dead provision, in which full ratification was to be completed. Such drop-dead provision, in the congressional “Resolve,” read as follows: “That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress.” This proposed Amendment did not receive the requisite number of State approvals and expired on August 29, 1985, seven years after the date transmitted to the States.

Through August 29, 1985, the date of expiration, and as best determined, this proposed Amendment had been ratified by the following eighteen States, thirty-eight States then being necessary for Final Ratification — New Jersey, September 11, 1978; Ohio, November 30, 1978; Michigan, December 12, 1978; Massachusetts, March 19, 1979; Minnesota, March 19, 1979; Connecticut, April 11, 1979; Wisconsin, November 12, 1979; Nebraska, February 11, 1980; Maryland, March 19, 1980; Hawaii, April 17, 1980; Oregon, June 20, 1981; Maine, February 16, 1983; West Virginia, February 23, 1983; Rhode Island, May 13, 1983; Iowa, January 19, 1984; Louisiana, June 24, 1984; and Delaware, June 28, 1984. This proposed Amendment was rejected by South Dakota on February 2, 1980.

Background

The Constitution provided for a “District” to be the seat of Government for the United States and also provided that Congress shall regulate and make the laws relative to such “District.” Upon the commencement of the Government under the Constitution on March 4, 1789, New York City served as the seat of Government, a position it held under the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union.

On July 16, 1790, by an Act of Congress entitled “An Act for the Establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the Government of the United States,” permanent and temporary seats of Government were selected.  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was selected as a temporary seat of Government and served in such position from December 6, 1790, to November 30, 1800.  The District of Columbia (Washington DC) was selected as the permanent seat of the US Government, which was effective on December 1, 1800.

Land for the permanent seat of Government was donated by the States of Maryland and Virginia and the citizens in such areas became citizens in the District of Columbia. The Virginia area, which primarily included the county and city of Alexandria, was returned or “retroceded” to the State of Virginia in 1847 pursuant to a July 9, 1846, Act of Congress entitled “An Act to retrocede the County of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, to the State of Virginia.”

Under the Constitution, the citizens of the District of Columbia are not entitled to representation in Congress. Congress attempted to remedy this on several occasions including in 1960 when Congress proposed the constitutional Amendment to be ratified as Article of Amendment XXIII on March 29, 1961. During the process of debating this proposed Amendment, which was originally introduced as a Senate bill and which provided electors for President and Vice President, Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York introduced an amendment to the bill. Among other things, the “Keating Amendment” included representation in the House of Representatives for the District of Columbia. However, such proposal was subsequently eliminated from the bill before it’s finally passage and ultimately being proposed as a constitutional Amendment.

Efforts to provide for Congressional representation for the District Columbia were renewed in 1978, which led to the proposal of the above constitutional Amendment. This proposed Amendment would have treated the District of Columbia as “though it were [sic] a State” and there would have been representation in both the Senate and House of Representatives. However, as discussed above, such proposed Amendment did not receive a sufficient number of State ratifications and expired by its own terms on August 29, 1985.

Present Day Status

As previously discussed, upon the proposal of this Amendment by Congress on August 22, 1978, a seven-year time limit, or drop-dead provision for Final Ratification was prescribed. In accordance thereto, this proposed Amendment expired on August 29, 1985, and is no longer subject to any further ratification consideration by the States.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 38 – The Un-ratified Amendment Proposed on March 22, 1972 – Equal Rights
By David Robert Wood
July 15, 2012

This proposed Amendment to the Constitution would have specifically provided for equal rights under the law for both men and women.  Following is the original text of this proposed Amendment — “Article—”:                   

Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

This March 22, 1972, proposed Amendment on “Equal Rights” has not been ratified by the requisite number of States. It expired on March 23, 1979, as prescribed in the Congressional Joint Resolution proposing the Amendment and is no longer subject to State ratification.

This Amendment was proposed in the second session of the ninety-second Congress, by a Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 208) on March 22, 1972, when it passed the Senate, by a vote of 84 to 8. It had previously passed the House of Representatives on October 12, 1971, by a vote of 354 to 24. It was originally introduced in the House of Representatives on January 26, 1971, by Martha W. Griffiths from Michigan.

Following its passage, this Amendment was certified as proposed on March 24, 1972, by the Director of the Federal Register, Fred J. Emery. It was then transmitted to the fifty States for ratification consideration by Acting Administrator of General Services, Rod Kreger, on March 24, 1972.

In the Congressional resolution proposing it, and not in the main text of this proposed Amendment, Congress prescribed a seven-year time limit, or drop-dead provision, in which full ratification was to be completed. Such drop-dead provision read as follows — “That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission [to the States] by the Congress.” This proposed Amendment did not receive the requisite number of State approvals and expired at the end of the seven-year time limit on March 23, 1979.

Notwithstanding this and on October 20, 1978, during the second session of the ninety-fifth Congress, Congress passed and the President approved and signed a Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 638) extending the ratification period from March 23, 1979, to June 30, 1982. This Resolution first passed the House of Representatives on August 15, 1978, by a vote of 233 to 189, which was followed by passage in the Senate by a vote of 60 to 36 on October 6, 1978.

This Joint Resolution was subsequently disputed and adjudicated in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in the case of Idaho v. Freeman. Filed by the State of Idaho against Rear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman, III, then the Administrator of the General Services Administration of the United States, this case involved the constitutionality of the Joint Resolution extending the ratification period for this proposed Amendment. Further, the validity of the Idaho Legislature’s February 8, 1977, rescission of its previous ratification of this proposed Amendment of March 22, 1972, was also of issue.

The Court ruled on December 23, 1981, and relative to the ratification time frame extension, Judge Marion Jones Callister declared, “that Congress’ attempted extension of the time for the ratification” of the proposed “Equal Rights” Amendment “was null and void.” Congress has specific Power to propose Amendments to the Constitution and to select from two methods of ratification. This is specified in Article V of the Constitution which provision is all-inclusive with respect to amending the Constitution. As specified in Article V, a two-thirds or greater vote is required to propose an amendment to the Constitution, by each of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The passage of this Joint Resolution by the Senate and House was clearly by less than the two-thirds minimum requirement.

With respect to Idaho’s rescission of its prior ratification, the Court found that it was proper and declared “that a state has the power and right to rescind a prior ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment at any time prior to the unrescinded [sic] ratification by three-fourths of the States of the United States.”  Judge Callister noted that “it seems clear from the statements of the founding fathers and from most courts in considering the amendment process that a ratification is linked to the great wellspring of legitimate constitutional power — the will of the people.” Also, “considering that an amendment cannot become part of the Constitution until a proper consensus of the people has been reached and it is the exclusive role of the states to determine what the local sentiment is, it logically follows that the subsequent act of rescission would promote the democratic ideal by giving a truer picture of the people’s wills as of the time three-fourths of the states have acted in affirming” a proposed Amendment.

This opinion was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and the original judgment was stayed on January 25, 1982. Before the appellate review process was completed, the disputed extension expired by its own terms on June 30, 1982, without Final Ratification by the requisite three-fourths States. As such, on October 4, 1982, and as suggested by the Administrator of General Services (the defendant) on July 9, 1982, the District Court judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court and dismissed as being moot. The mootness doctrine being used herein was based upon a date after the June 30, 1982 extension, because before such date, the mootness doctrine would not have applied.

Notwithstanding the dismissal on the grounds of mootness, the District Court, by careful reasoning and analysis, determined that the issue was not a “political question,” a somewhat subjective position used all too often, but rather was subject to reasonable Court justiciability. In pursuing such, the District Court’s analysis and ruling was ostensibly reasonable and objective, and is guidance for the future. In interpreting Article V, reasonable implications were considered along with the expressed language in the Clause. This multifarious consideration approach was very adequately described by Justice Willis Van Devanter in the 1921 Supreme Court decision in Dillon v. Gloss, when he stated that “for with the Constitution, as with a statute or other written instrument, what is reasonably implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed.”

Through March 23, 1979, the end of the original seven-year period for full ratification, and as best determined, this proposed Amendment had been ratified by the following thirty States, thirty-eight States then being necessary for Final Ratification — Hawaii, March 22, 1972; Delaware, March 23, 1972; New Hampshire, March 23, 1972; Iowa, March 24, 1972; Kansas, March 28, 1972; Texas, March 30, 1972; Alaska, April 5, 1972, Rhode Island, April 14, 1972; New Jersey, April 17, 1972; Colorado, April 21, 1972; West Virginia, April 22, 1972; Wisconsin, April 26, 1972; New York, May 18, 1972; Michigan, May 22, 1972; Maryland, May 26, 1972; Massachusetts, June 21, 1972, Pennsylvania, September 26, 1972, California, November 13, 1972; Wyoming, January 26, 1973, Minnesota, February 8, 1973, Oregon, February 8, 1973; New Mexico, February 28, 1973; Vermont, March 1, 1973; Connecticut, March 15, 1973; Washington, March 22, 1973; Maine, January 18, 1974; Montana, January 25, 1974; Ohio, February 7, 1974; North Dakota, February 3, 1975; and Indiana on January 24, 1977.

In addition, this proposed Amendment was ratified by Idaho on March 24, 1972, then rescinded on February 8, 1977; by Nebraska on March 29, 1972, then rescinded on March 15, 1973; by Tennessee on April 4, 1972, then rescinded on April 23, 1974; by Kentucky on June 27, 1972, then rescinded on March 20, 1978; and by South Dakota on February 5, 1973, then rescinded on March 5, 1979 and effective on March 23, 1979. This proposed Amendment was repeatedly rejected by the Arizona legislature from 1973 to 1978 and was rejected by the Utah legislature on February 5, 1979.

Background

Although the “Equal Rights” Amendment was proposed in 1972, its actual beginning was during the Progressive Era in the early part of the twentieth century, when societal reforms were high profile. Such reforms included, among others, the prohibition of alcohol, restricting child labor, the direct election of Senators and women’s right to vote, all of which were subjects of constitutional Amendments proposed from 1912 to 1924.

Article of Amendment XIX, proposed in 1919 and ratified in 1920, provided women with the right to vote; and the proposed “Equal Rights” Amendment was a continuation of these efforts by specifically recognizing the equality of men and women. This first constitutional amendment on equal rights was introduced in Congress in 1923 at the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Woman’s Rights Convention of 1848. It was entitled the “Lucretia Mott Amendment” for an early leader in women’s rights who was also a vocal abolitionist. This original proposal, authored by Alice Paul, a founder of the National Woman’s Party, was that “Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction.” For the next fifty years, an “Equal Rights’ amendment was introduced in every session of Congress in one or the other houses; and each was usually assign to a Congressional committee where they died.

The political and social environment culminating in the 1972 congressional passage and this Amendment’s proposal was spawned in the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The 1920’s “radical” ideas of women’s equality and rights had become more mainstream in the 1960’s and 1970’s; and equal rights advocates were numerous, vocal and effective. Passage of an “Equal Rights” Amendment was also supported by numerous organizations including the Democratic Party, Republican Party and labor unions such as the AFL-CIO. 

Upon the proposal of the “Equal Rights” Amendment on March 22, 1972, Congress specified a seven-year timeframe in which to achieve Final Ratification, and in the first year, twenty-nine of the necessary thirty-eight States had ratified it.  Thereafter ratification was slow with only five States ratifying it, and two States rescinding their prior ratifications from 1974 to 1977.

Approaching the March 23, 1979, deadline for Final Ratification, only thirty States had ratified the proposed Amendment, which was eight shy of the necessary three-fourths of the States. In October 1978, as previously discussed, the deadline for ratification was inappropriately extended to June 30, 1982. This extension was due to political pressures on Congress by women’s rights organizations. Significantly influential was a large march in Washington D.C. in July 1978, which was organized by the National Organization for Women (“NOW”). Nonetheless and during this three-year extension, opposition to the Amendment gained support and momentum, and no additional States ratified the proposed Amendment. 

Present Day Status

As previously discussed, upon proposal of this Amendment by Congress on March 22, 1972, Congress prescribed a seven-year time limit, or drop-dead provision, for Final Ratification. In accordance thereto, and notwithstanding the ineffective Congressional extension, this proposed Amendment expired on March 23, 1979, and is no longer subject to any further ratification consideration. Since 1982, continued efforts have been undertaken to adopt a new equal rights amendment without any proposal by Congress.

Following the Final Ratification of Article of Amendment XXVII in 1992, originally proposed over two hundred years earlier, some have argued and rationalized that the expired “Equal Rights” Amendment is still viable. Further, they argue that Final Ratification will occur upon obtaining three additional State ratifications, known as the “Three State Strategy.” Their view that only three additional ratifications are necessary, instead of eight, is based upon the argument that the previous rescissions by the five States are invalid.

Although this is contrary to general legal and scholarly thought, they postulate that Congress has an all-inclusive power to reinstate the proposed Amendment as if it had not expired, to consider the prior State ratifications as still valid, and to disallow rescissions. They argue that this power is based upon the 1939 ruling in the Supreme Court case of Coleman v. Miller, where it was ruled that such issues were “Political Questions,” subject to the discretion of Congress and not otherwise subject to judicial review.

They further argue that Congress’ power to reinstate the proposed Amendment’s viability is in accordance with the 1921 Supreme Court case of Dillon v. Gloss. In this court case, it was ruled that it is within the power of Congress, in proposing an Amendment, to specify a timeframe in which ratification must occur and that the “reasonableness” of such timeframe, or lack thereof, was a “Political Question” and not subject to judicial review. It is contended that the two hundred and three years taken to ratify Article of Amendment XXVII, and its acceptance by Congress, sets a precedent and implies that two hundred plus years to ratify an Amendment may be “reasonable.” It should be noted, however, that the 1789 proposed Amendment, to be ratified in 1992 as Article of Amendment XXVII, did not include a time limit for Final Ratification.

Although some of the arguments are somewhat provocative, they are not necessarily persuasive. It is unlikely that any Congress will act to reinstate the vitality of this proposed Amendment. Instead, if deemed necessary, Congress would likely propose a new amendment.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 37 – The Un-ratified Amendment Proposed on June 2, 1924 – Child Labor
By David Robert Wood
July 1, 2012

This proposed Amendment provides Congress with the power to regulate child labor. Following is the original text of this proposed Amendment — “Article—”:

Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.

Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress.

This June 2, 1924, proposed Amendment on “Child Labor” has not been ratified by the requisite number of States and continues to be subject to ratification. It was proposed in the first session of the sixty-eighth Congress, by a Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 184) on June 2, 1924, when it passed the Senate by a vote of 62 to 23. It had previously passed the House of Representatives on April 26, 1924, by a vote of 297 to 69, with 2 answering present. It was originally introduced in the House of Representatives on February 13, 1924, by Israel M. Foster from Ohio.

Following its passage, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes certified as proposed, and transmitted this proposed Amendment to the forty-eight States for ratification consideration, on June 6, 1924.

To date, as best determined, this proposed Amendment has been ratified by twenty-eight States, thirty-eight States now being necessary for Final Ratification — Arkansas, June 28, 1924; California, January 8, 1925; Arizona, January 28, 1925; Wisconsin, February 25, 1925; Montana, February 11, 1927; Colorado, April 28, 1931; Oregon, January 31, 1933; Washington, February 3, 1933; North Dakota, March 4, 1933 (after having rejected it on January 28, 1925 (Senate)); Ohio, March 22, 1933; Michigan, May 10, 1933; New Hampshire, May 17, 1933 (after having rejected it on March 18, 1925); New Jersey, June 12, 1933; Illinois, June 30, 1933; Oklahoma, July 5, 1933; Iowa, December 5, 1933; West Virginia, December 12, 1933; Minnesota, December 14, 1933 (after having rejected it on April 14, 1925); Maine, December 16, 1933 (after having rejected it on April 10, 1925); Pennsylvania, December 21, 1933 (after having rejected it on April 16, 1925); Wyoming, January 31, 1935; Utah, February 5, 1935 (after having rejected it on February 4, 1925); Idaho, February 7, 1935 (after having rejected it on February 7, 1925 (House)); Indiana, February 8, 1935 (after having rejected it on March 5, 1925); Kentucky, January 13, 1937 (after having rejected it on March 24, 1926); Nevada, January 29, 1937; New Mexico, February 12, 1937 (after having rejected it in 1935); and Kansas, February 25, 1937 (after having rejected it on January 27, 1925).

This proposed Amendment has also been rejected by fifteen States — Louisiana, June 27, 1924 (House); Georgia, August 6, 1924; North Carolina, August 23, 1924; South Carolina, January 27, 1925; Texas, January 27, 1925; Tennessee, February 4, 1925; Connecticut, February 11, 1925; Massachusetts, February 19, 1925; South Dakota, February 24, 1925, July 31, 1933 and February 11, 1937; Delaware, February 25, 1925; Vermont, February 26, 1925; Missouri, March 20, 1925; Florida, May 14, 1925; Virginia, January 22, 1926; and Maryland, March 18, 1927. No actions have been indicated for the States of Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York and Rhode Island.

Background

Societal reform restricting the use of children in the work force gained significant momentum beginning in the early part of the twentieth century. Historically, child labor was an important part of the economy, primarily on family farms. Beginning in the mid-1700s, the start of the Industrial Age, the American population began to slowly shift from the rural, agricultural environment to the urban, factory and manufacturing environment. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, this shift accelerated and there was significant and rapid growth in urban industries. This necessitated the use of children to supplement the adult workforce, which was also a cheap source of labor.

Through 1900, there were no federal and only a few State laws that regulated and restricted the use of child labor. However, the Progressive Era was underway and proponents, many from the urban middle-class, advocated and pursued reforms relative to societal ills such as the consumption of alcohol, women’s rights, worker’s rights and working conditions, and the exploitation of child labor. These reform efforts were also significantly bolstered by a proliferation of newspaper and magazine articles by “investigative journalists,” also called “muckrakers.” These articles, often colorful in prose, brought significant attention to poverty and urban slums, ruthless business practices, dangerous working conditions, child abuse in the work force, and corruption in local governments.

One of the first formal, public organizations in support of restricting child labor and improving working conditions was the National Child Labor Committee formed in 1904. This organization and others were successful in achieving various social reforms, first on local and State levels and than at the national level. At the national level, the first major legislation to regulate child labor was the Keating-Owens Child Labor Act in 1916. Purportedly justified under the commerce clause in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution, it severely restricted the interstate transportation or foreign shipment of any products from mines, quarries, mills, canneries, workshops, factories or manufactures that did not otherwise adhere to certain minimum hiring ages and other requirements of the Act. However it was short-lived, being found unconstitutional in the Supreme Court case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, the “Child Labor” case. Decided on June 3, 1918, the court ruled the Act was beyond Congress’ power to regulate commerce and that it infringed upon constitutional powers reserved to the States under Article of Amendment X.

In 1919, shortly after the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, Congress passed the Child Labor Tax Act, which was fallaciously entitled and portrayed as a revenue raising measure but was in substance a law to indirectly regulate and restrict child labor by imposing a ten percent excise tax. It applied to net profits of employers in the same industries previously named in the Keating-Owens Child Labor Act, and who employed children under certain minimum ages.

However, and like with the preceding Keating-Owens Child Labor Act, this Act was also short-lived and found to be unconstitutional. In the 1922 Supreme Court case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., the “Child Labor Tax” case, the Court ruled that the purpose of the Act was not taxation, an otherwise legitimate congressional power, but rather was to federally regulate child labor.  As such and as previously held in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court determined this power to be that of the States and not the federal government.

In response to the two adverse Supreme Court decisions, at least in part, Congress proposed the “Child Labor” Amendment on June 2, 1924, which was the fifth constitutional Amendment proposed during the Progressive Era. Preceding it was Article of Amendment XVI concerning income taxes, proposed in 1909 and ratified in 1913; Article of Amendment XVII on the direct election of Senators, proposed in 1912 and ratified in 1913; Article of Amendment XVIII on alcohol prohibition, proposed in 1917 and ratified in 1919; and Article of Amendment XIX on women’s suffrage, proposed in 1919 and ratified in 1920. If ratified, the “Child Labor” Amendment would have overruled the aforementioned 1918 and 1922 Supreme Court cases.

From 1924 to 1932, and despite popular support including by Presidents Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, twenty-six States had rejected this proposed Amendment and only six States had ratified it. The rejections were significantly due to aggressive lobbying efforts on the State Legislatures by opponents including manufacturing and other business interests.

In 1933, there was a renewed State interest and from 1933 to 1937, twenty-two additional States ratified the Amendment, half of which had previously rejected it. This renewed interest was significantly due to the massive unemployment during the Great Depression and a public desire that available jobs be given to adults, and not to children. However, since 1937, there appears not to have been any addition State ratifications of this proposed Amendment.

In 1939, the ratification of this proposed Amendment by the Kansas Legislature was adjudicated before the United States Supreme Court in the case of Coleman v. Miller. On February 25, 1937, this proposed Amendment was voted on in the Kansas Senate and twenty State Senators voted in favor of passage and twenty voted against it. In accordance with the Constitution of the State of Kansas, the presiding officer of the Senate, the Lieutenant Governor, cast the tie breaking vote and voted in favor of passage. This resulted in a favorable approval vote of twenty-one versus twenty against. Following the Senate’s passage this resolution was then passed by the Kansas House of Representatives by a majority vote of its members; thereby effectuating the ratification of this proposed Amendment by the State of Kansas.

A primary issue before the Supreme Court was the validity of the tie-breaking vote cast by the Lieutenant Governor. Specifically, the petitioners challenged the right of the Lieutenant Governor to cast the deciding vote in the Senate because he was a State executive branch officer. They argued, “that, in light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state constitution, as construed by the supreme court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the ‘legislature’ so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could not be permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the senate was equally divided.”

On this question, the Supreme Court was equally divided and did not render an opinion. It was stated that “whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the Court expresses no opinion upon that point.” The result was that the vote cast by the Lieutenant Governor, as presiding officer of the Senate and in accordance with the State Constitution, was valid and therefore resulted in passage by the Senate.

Another issue of contention in this court case was the consideration of the State’s prior rejection of this proposed Article of Amendment twelve years earlier on January 27, 1925; and whether this rejection otherwise forbid future legislative consideration, as was done in 1937. The Court stated that in accordance with historical precedent, “the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.”

The Court further observed that “Article 5 [of the Constitution], speaking solely of ratification, contains no provisions as to rejection. Nor has the Congress enacted a statute relating to rejections.” Thus a State may ratify a proposed Amendment to the Constitution, even after it had previously rejected the same proposed Amendment.

Also of consideration before the Court was the continued vitality of this proposed Amendment and whether the thirteen year time lapse from its proposal in 1924 to its ratification by Kansas in 1937 invalidated the ratification. This specifically concerned Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes who stated that “the more serious question is whether the proposal by the Congress of the amendment had lost its vitality through lapse of time and hence it could not be ratified by the Kansas legislature in 1937.” However, the Court refused to rule on this, again indicating that this issue was political, within the purview of Congress, and not subject to review or determination in the Supreme Court.

The Court went on to say, “in determining whether a question falls within that category [political], the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations. There are many illustrations in the field of our conduct of foreign relations, where there are ‘considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a Court of Justice’.”

Simply stated, some actions undertaken by the Executive and Legislative Branches, by their nature, are not subject to affirmation or rejection by the Courts. The end result of this case was that the ratification action of the State of Kansas was entirely appropriate and valid.

Two years earlier, these same issues and concerns were considered in a State court with dramatically different results. Specifically, the validity of Kentucky’s 1937 ratification was adjudicated in the Kentucky State Court of Appeals in the case of Wise et al. v. Chandler et al. In contention were the continuing powers of a State to ratify a proposed Amendment after having previously rejected it, and the reasonableness of the timeframe for the ratification of a proposed Amendment after its proposal.

With respect to the first issue, the Court determined that State of Kentucky’s 1937 ratification of the “Child Labor” Amendment was invalid because it had previously rejected such proposed Amendment in 1926. The State Court held that once a State has taken any kind of ratification action on a proposed Amendment to the Constitution, whatever it might be, that such State is estopped from further considering such proposed Amendment.

Of particular interest with respect to this Kentucky Court decision was the Court’s discussion and justification of the seceded States’ actions in rejecting and then ratifying Article of Amendment XIV in 1866 to 1868. The Court justified the appropriateness of such State’s ratifications following rejections, contrary to its own ruling, by stating that “their previous rejections were void because the then governments of those States were illegal and their Legislatures were without authority to act.” The “illegal” governments referred to were not those of the former “Confederate States of America,” but rather governments organized under Presidential Proclamations and supervision in 1865 and 1866, until changed by Congress in 1867.

The second issue of contention in this court case was the reasonableness of the timeframe for the ratification of a proposed Amendment following its proposal. Citing the seven year time limit imposed by Congress to ratify Article of Amendment XVIII, the Kentucky Court determined that the twelve and one-half year ratification time period by Kentucky was unreasonable. As such, the State Court held that this proposed Amendment had lost its vitality and was no longer subject to State ratification, and that ratification by the Legislature of the State of Kentucky was invalid.

Rulings by State courts are generally inferior to Federal courts and specifically the United States Supreme Court. The Kentucky State Court of Appeals rulings in Wise et al. v. Chandler et al were effectively negated two years later by the United States Supreme Court case of Coleman v. Miller.

As to Congress’ power to federally regulate child labor, it subsequently adopted the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, which, among other things, again regulated the interstate transportation of goods made by businesses employing children under certain ages. When the constitutionality of this law was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the 1941 case of the United States v. Darby, the Court found it constitutional and within the powers of Congress. This effectively overruled both Hammer v. Dagenhart and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., and affirmatively established the power of Congress to regulate and restrict the use of child labor.

Present Day Status

Unlike most of the other Amendments proposed by Congress in the twentieth century, Congress did not specify a time frame for the Final Ratification of the 1924 proposed “Child Labor” Amendment. As such, this proposed Amendment continues to be subject to ratification by three-quarters of the States. In order for this to occur, ten additional State ratifications are necessary.

Although this Amendment was proposed in 1924, the subject matter is certainly as pertinent now as then. This proposed Amendment would empower Congress to “limit, regulate, and prohibit” any work that may be otherwise performed by persons under eighteen years of age, i.e., minors in most States. At the time this Amendment was proposed, and until 1941, this power was considered to be solely a State power by the Supreme Court. However, with the decision in ­­United States v. Darby, the Supreme Court reversed prior court decisions, ruling that this is a proper power exercisable by the federal government (Congress), at least as to interstate commerce. As such, the congressional powers in this proposed Amendment are generally redundant to the congressional powers recognized by the 1941 Supreme Court. Therefore, ratification of this proposed Amendment is generally unnecessary. However, and without a constitutional Amendment, a future Supreme Court could certainly reverse this prior court ruling.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 36 – The Un-ratified Amendment Proposed on March 2, 1861 – Protecting Slavery
David Robert Wood
June 15, 2012

This proposed Amendment to the Constitution would have protected slavery in the States by prohibiting the federal government from abolishing it at the national level. Following is the original text of this proposed Amendment — “Article XIII”:    

No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

Proposed as “Article XIII” on March 2, 1861, this proposed Amendment, “Protecting Slavery,” has not been ratified by the requisite number of States and continues to be subject to ratification. Commonly known as the “Corwin Amendment,” it preceded and should not be confused with Article of Amendment XIII, “Abolishing Slavery,” which was proposed by Congress on January 31, 1865, and was fully ratified on June 30, 1865.

This Amendment was proposed in the second session of the thirty-sixth Congress, by a simple Resolution (H. Res. 80/H. R. 80) concurred to by both Houses of Congress on March 2, 1861, when it passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 12. On February 28, 1861, it had previously passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 133 to 65. It was originally introduced in the House of Representatives on February 27, 1861, and was the second in the series of propositions reported from the House Select Committee of Thirty-three.

Following its passage, it was certified as proposed by Secretary of State William H. Seward on March 13, 1861. It was then transmitted to the States for ratification consideration on March 16, 1861, by President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward.

This proposed Amendment was a prohibition from further amending the Constitution to allow the federal government to prohibit slavery. It was passed and proposed in the last days of the thirty-sixth Congress and two days before the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln as the sixteenth President of the United States on March 4, 1861. As of the date of its passage, the States of South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas had previously adopted Ordinances of Secession and had dissolved their union with the United States. Six of these States, excluding Texas, were not then represented in Congress, except for one of the four Representatives from Louisiana who remained through the session’s end on the following day of March 3, 1861. Texas’s secession, although approved in February 1861, was not effective until March 3, 1861.

On March 2, 1861, this proposed Amendment was unnecessarily “Approved” by outgoing President James Buchanan by his signature on the congressional Resolution. As previously discussed, the constitutional Amendment process, as prescribed in Article V of the Constitution, does not include approbation, or approval by the President of the United States.

To date, as best determined, this proposed Amendment has been ratified by only two States, thirty-eight States now being necessary for Final Ratification — Ohio on May 13, 1861, and Maryland on January 10, 1862. Illinois ineffectively ratified this proposed Amendment on February 14, 1862, by utilizing a State Constitutional Convention. In proposing such Amendment to the Constitution, Congress specified that State ratification was to be by State Legislatures, and not by State Conventions.

Background

As discussed relative to Article of Amendment XIII, controversies regarding the acceptability of slavery in the United States were at an all time high in the mid-1800s. Nonetheless, State rights relative to such an issue were still respected by many, including many members of Congress. With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, many of the slave States were concerned about Lincoln’s abolitionist viewpoint. These concerns were manifested by the secession of six Southern States through February 1861, with five others to follow.

In the first session of the thirty-sixth Congress, held from December 5, 1859, to March 3, 1861, over two hundred measures relating to slavery were introduced. The scope of these measures ranged from prohibiting slavery to protecting it in those States where it existed. Such slavery protective actions were an attempt at reconciliation with the Southern slave States, enticements to discourage further State secessions and to encourage the seceded States to rejoin the Union. One such measure to protect slavery was originally introduced in the waning days of the thirty-sixth Congress by Representative Thomas Corwin of Ohio.  This measure culminated in the proposal of this Amendment on March 2, 1861, only two days before the presidential inauguration of Abraham Lincoln.

Present Day Status

Unlike most of the constitutional Amendments proposed by Congress in the twentieth century, Congress did not specify a time frame in which Final Ratification must occur. As such, this proposed Amendment continues to be subject to ratification by three-quarters of the States. In order for this to occur, thirty-six additional State ratifications are necessary, which is extremely unlikely.

This proposed Amendment would have protected slavery by providing that there shall be no constitutional Amendment empowering the United States Congress to “abolish or interfere” with slave ownership, which was then legally practiced in a number of States and primarily in the Southern States. This congressional action was based, in part, upon the desire to placate Southern State concerns regarding the legal retention of slavery, especially in light of the inauguration of President Abraham Lincoln.

Although the subject matter of this proposed Amendment is clearly stale dated, its impact, if ratified, appears would be benign. The language of this proposed Amendment would only address future actions relative to “persons held to labor or service” in a State. Since the Constitution has already been amended to eliminate slavery by the Final Ratification of Article of Amendment XIII on June 30, 1865, the specific issue and subject matter of this proposed Amendment is moot.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 35 – The Un-ratified Amendment Proposed on May 1, 1810 – Titles of Nobility
By David Robert Wood
June 1, 2012

This proposed constitutional Amendment concerned the granting of “Titles of Nobility” to citizens of the United States by a foreign government. Following is the original text of this proposed Amendment:

If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.

The May 1, 1810, proposed Amendment on “Titles of Nobility” has not been ratified by the requisite number of States and continues to be subject to ratification. It was proposed in the second session of the eleventh Congress by a simple Resolution, which was concurred to by both Houses of Congress on May 1, 1810, when it passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 87 to 3. It had previously passed the Senate by a vote of 19 to 5 on April 27, 1810. This proposed Amendment was originally introduced in the Senate by Phillip Reed of Maryland on January 18, 1810.

Following proposal, Secretary of State Robert Smith transmitted this proposed Amendment to the seventeen States for ratification consideration on January 15, 1811. To date, as best determined, this proposed Amendment has been ratified by twelve States, thirty-eight States now being necessary for Final Ratification — Maryland, December 25, 1810; Kentucky, January 29, 1811; Ohio, January 31, 1811; Delaware, February 2, 1811; Pennsylvania, February 6, 1811; New Jersey, February 13, 1811; Vermont, October 24, 1811; Tennessee, November 21, 1811; Georgia, December 13, 1811; North Carolina, December 23, 1811; Massachusetts, February 27, 1812; and New Hampshire, December 9, 1812.

This proposed Amendment was rejected by New York on March 12, 1812 (Senate), Connecticut on May 13, 1813, and Rhode Island on September 15, 1814.

Background

In the late eighteenth century, during the formation of the U.S. government, “Titles of Nobility” were of particular concern to many and were considered to be distasteful and inappropriate. It was believed that “Titles of Nobility” recognized elitism, a concept generally disdained in the United States and adverse to the Declaration of Independence. Further, there was also a concern that gifts or emoluments by foreign principalities to U.S. government officers and officials would unduly influence such officers and officials.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution restricted the use of “Titles of Nobility,” providing that they will not be granted by the U.S. government. This Article also restricted governmental officers from accepting gifts, titles or compensation from any foreign nation, unless otherwise approved by Congress.

In support of the ratification of the Constitution in 1787–1788, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the prohibitions and restrictions included in Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 were “the corner-stone of republican government.” Further, “for so long as they [“Titles of Nobility”] are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.”

 While ratifying the Constitution, a number of States believed that further restrictions on accepting titles of nobility or other emoluments were necessary. Six States specifically called for amending the Constitution so as to prohibit Congress from consenting to foreign titles of nobility or other emoluments that might be granted to government officers and officials. This would have resulted in an absolute prohibition on any public official from accepting such titles of nobility or other emoluments. In the first Congress, such additional restrictions were discussed, but no formal actions were taken.

Not until 1810 was the concern about “Titles of Nobility” again raised in the U.S. Congress.  On January 18, 1810, Senator Phillip Reed from Maryland introduced a resolution to amend the Constitution by prohibiting any citizen, who has accepted a “Title of Nobility,” from holding any public office. Following its introduction, this resolution was further amended by stripping citizenship from individuals who had accepted titles of nobility, unless otherwise approved by Congress.

The history of the proposal of this Amendment is somewhat uncertain and has been the subject of speculation. Some believed that the resolution was due to the growing animosity of the general American public toward foreigners, leading up to the War of 1812. Others believed that the resolution was politically motivated against Elizabeth Patterson from a prominent Baltimore Republican family, with Senator Reed being a member of the Democratic Party.

Elizabeth Patterson was previously married to Jerome Bonaparte, a younger brother of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, from approximately 1803 to 1806. In 1805, a child, Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte was born from their union and he was a citizen of the United States as a result of his mother’s citizenship; and notwithstanding that he was born in Great Britain where Patterson resided, being otherwise denied entry into France by Napoleon. In 1806, by a state decree issued by Napoleon, the marriage was annulled. Thereafter, Patterson, to be known as the “Duchess of Baltimore,” formally relinquished the use of the “Bonaparte” surname, returned to America and was granted an annuity by the French Government. It was also rumored that Patterson sought a formal “Title” from the French government although this seemed unlikely given her relationship with the French Government and the disdain of, and by, Napoleon.

Almost seven years after the Amendment’s proposal, and not knowing the status of its ratification, Congress passed a Resolution on December 31, 1817, requesting the President obtain State ratification information on this “13^th article of the amendment.” In response on February 4, 1818, Secretary of State James Monroe reported that twelve States had ratified it, two States had rejected it, one State had not acted upon it and two States had not responded. Twelve ratifying States were then insufficient to constitute Final Ratification because, on that date, there were twenty States in the Union and three-fourths of the States would have been fifteen .

Notwithstanding the above, and for most of the nineteenth century, it was erroneously believed that this proposed Amendment had been fully ratified. In many publications, it was included as a ratified Amendment, even as late as 1896–1897 when it was indicated as ratified in House Document No. 353, Part 2, from the second session of the fifty-fourth Congress. This incorrect view likely occurred because of the mistaken belief that the State of South Carolina had ratified it. The South Carolina Senate did pass a ratifying resolution in 1811. However, this resolution was apparently not acted upon by the South Carolina House of Representatives, and was therefore not passed. South Carolina was one of the two non-responding States referenced in the February 1818, report by Secretary of State Monroe.

Present Day Status

Upon proposal of this Amendment by Congress on May 1, 1810, unlike most of the Amendments proposed by Congress in the twentieth century, Congress did not specify a time limit in which Final Ratification was to be accomplished. As such, this proposed Amendment continues to be subject to ratification by three-quarters of the States. In order for this to happen, twenty-six additional State ratifications are now necessary.

Following the Final Ratification of Article of Amendment XXVII in 1992, a 200-plus year old proposed Amendment, interest was renewed in the other four un-ratified Amendments, with significant attention on this “Titles of Nobility” amendment. There is a minority argument that ratification of this proposed Amendment is still necessary, and a fringe group has set forth some rather interesting, although complete fallacious and misleading, views that this Amendment, referred to by the acronym “TONA” (Titles of Nobility Amendment) has already been ratified.

Among their arguments, bordering on the absurd, they rationalize that final ratification has been effectuated because of the fact that it was shown, although erroneously, as ratified in many nineteenth century publications. Further argued was that the State of Virginia had effectively ratified this proposed Amendment in 1819 when it enacted the publication of the Laws of Virginia in which the “Titles of Nobility” Amendment was erroneous included as ratified. They argued that because this publication included the proposed Amendment as ratified, and because this publication of the Laws of Virginia had been officially adopted, then Virginia had ratified this Amendment (although unknowingly). They conveniently overlook the fact that in 1819 there were twenty-one States, and Virginia’s pretended ratification would only be thirteen, three shy of the three-fourths requirement of sixteen States that would have then been necessary.

Notwithstanding the minority view in favor of ratification, the majority view is that restrictions relative to “Titles of Nobility” and other honorariums have been adequately addressed in Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, and that this proposed Amendment, which is punitive, is unnecessary, especially in this day and age. If ratified, this proposed Amendment could strip citizenship from any United States citizens who received and accepted any “title of nobility or honor” from any foreign country.  Further, unless otherwise permitted by Congress, United States citizenship could also to be stripped from those citizens who received, accepted and retained “any present, pension, office or emolument of any kind” from a foreign country.

If ratified, this proposed Amendment would otherwise prohibit accepted historical practices that are not otherwise repugnant to the Constitution. United States citizens may accept titles of nobility, or other honorariums from a foreign country, except as may be restricted by Clause 8 of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. Numerous U.S. citizens, including heads of state, have accepted honorariums, primarily since World War II, including, in recent years, former U.S. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, Generals Colin Powell and Wesley K. Clark, Bill Gates and Jerry Lewis. Ratification would likely prohibit this practice and would also create a somewhat chaotic situation with respect to the status of the individuals who had previously accepted “Titles of Nobility” or other honors from foreign nations.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 34 – Introduction to the Forgotten Amendments and the Un-ratified Amendment Proposed on September 25, 1789, “Article the first”
By David Robert Wood
May 15, 2012

Introduction to the Forgotten Amendments

Since the first meeting of the first Congress on March 4, 1789, and through July 15, 2004, in the one-hundred and eighth Congress, there have been approximately 11,226 measures introduced in Congress to amend the U.S. Constitution. Of these, only thirty-three constitutional Amendments have ultimately been proposed and only twenty-seven have been ratified as Articles of Amendment I to XXVII. Six of the proposed Amendments have not been ratified of which two have expired as a result of not receiving three-fourth’s State ratification approval by the deadlines imposed by Congress.

The Constitution does not provide a time limit for the ratification of Amendments proposed to the Constitution. However, starting with the proposal of Article of Amendment XVIII on December 18, 1917, and with the exceptions of Article of Amendment XIX in 1919 and the proposed and un-ratified “Child Labor” Amendment in 1924, Congress has imposed a seven-year time limit within which three-fourth’s State ratification was to be accomplished. The June 4, 1919, proposal of Article of Amendment XIX, and the “Child Labor” Amendment proposed on June 2, 1924, did not include time limits for ratification.

The seven-year time limits for the ratification of Articles of Amendment XVIII, XX, XXI and XXII were included in the texts of these proposed Amendments. For Articles of Amendment XXIII to XXVI, and the un-ratified and expired Amendment on “Equal Rights,” Congress included the seven-year time limiting language in the “Resolves” proposing each of these Amendments, and not within the texts of the proposed Amendments. For the August 22, 1978, proposed Amendment on “District of Columbia Representation,” heretofore expired, the seven-year time limiting language was included in both the text of the proposed Amendment and in the “Resolve” proposing it.

Congress’ Power to establish a reasonable time period for the ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution was addressed by the Supreme Court in the 1921 case of Dillon v. Gloss. Appealed from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, the appellee argued that Article of Amendment XVIII was invalid, claiming that Congress’ action in setting a seven-year time period to accomplish full and Final Ratification was unconstitutional. Instead, the Supreme Court found that it was not a constitutional violation and was within the scope of Congress’ power to impose a reasonable time limit for full ratification.

As to the question of what is reasonable, which was not of direct issue in this court case, the Court indicated that this was a “Political Question” and not justiciable. The Court noted that “of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable limits, to fix a definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt. As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to deal with the subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions may require; and Article 5 [of the Constitution] is no exception to the rule. Whether a definite period for ratification shall be fixed, so that all may know what it is and speculation on what is a reasonable time may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a matter of detail which Congress may determine as an incident of its power to designate the mode of ratification.”

Almost twenty years later, the Supreme Court reiterated this view in the 1939 case of Coleman v. Miller, declaring that the question of the reasonableness of the time within which a sufficient number of States must act to ratify a constitutional Amendment is a political question to be determined by Congress. Congress has the sole Power to determine the time period, if any, in which an Amendment must be ratified, and to determine what time period is reasonable. The Supreme Court again regarded this issue as political in nature, within the purview of Congress, and not subject to Court review or determination.

With respect to the seven-year ratification time limit for the March 22, 1972, proposed Amendment on “Equal Rights,” an Act of Congress was approved and signed by the President which extended the original time limit deadline from March 23, 1979, to June 30, 1982. The Joint Resolution extending the ratification deadline was passed in the Senate on October 6, 1978, by a vote of sixty to thirty-six. This was followed by passage in the House of Representatives on August 15, 1978, by a vote of two-hundred and thirty-three to one-hundred and eighty-nine. Both of these votes were by less then two-thirds of the respective bodies, which is otherwise necessary when proposing an Amendment to the Constitution.

The validity of this extension was subsequently adjudicated in the 1981 court case of Idaho v. Freeman, which was heard in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. A case of first impression, Judge Marion Jones Callister ruled on December 23, 1981, declaring “that Congress’ attempted extension of the time for the ratification” of the proposed “Equal Rights” Amendment “was null and void.” Congress has the sole and specific Power to propose Amendments to the Constitution and to select from two methods of ratification. This is specified in Article V of the Constitution which provision is all-inclusive with respect to amending the Constitution. As specified in Article V, a two-thirds or greater vote by each of the Senate and House of Representatives is required to propose an Amendment to the Constitution. Clearly, the passage of the extension Resolution was by less than the two-thirds minimum required.

This opinion was appealed, and before the appellate review process of the District Court’s opinion was completed, the disputed extension had expired by its own terms on June 30, 1982. Further, the proposed Amendment was also not ratified by the requisite three-fourths States by this date. As such and on October 4, 1982, as suggested by the Administrator of General Services (the defendant) on July 9, 1982, the District Court judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court and dismissed as being moot. The mootness doctrine being used herein was based upon a date after June 30, 1982, because, before such date, the mootness doctrine would not have applied.

Un-Ratified Amendment Proposed on September 25, 1789, “Article the first”

This proposed Amendment to the Constitution provides for the number of representatives in the House of Representations based upon a calculation on the population and utilizing a restrictive formula. Following is the original text of this proposed Amendment — “Article the first”:

After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which, the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.

The above-proposed Amendment, “Article the first,” was included in the first twelve proposed Amendments, which included “Article the second,” ratified as Article of Amendment XXVII, and “Article the third” to “Article the twelfth,” ratified as Articles of Amendment I to X, the latter commonly known as the “Bill of Rights.”. These first twelve Amendments to Constitution were proposed by a simple Resolution, concurred to by both Houses of Congress, in the first session of the first Congress on September 25, 1789, when they passed the Senate, in amended form, by “Resolve” and without detailed voting information.

The process in proposing these first Amendments to the Constitution began on June 8, 1789. A motion was made and seconded in the House of Representatives that Congress should consider “certain specific amendments” to become part of the Constitution, which were then referred to the Committee of the Whole House. On July 21, 1789, the task for amending the Constitution was assigned to a committee comprised of one Representative from each State, eleven States having then ratified the Constitution. To be known as the “Committee of Eleven,” the members included John Vining from Delaware, James Madison from Virginia, Abraham Baldwin from Georgia, Roger Sherman from Connecticut, Aedanus Burke from South Carolina, Nicholas Gilman from New Hampshire, George Clymer from Pennsylvania, Egbert Benson from New York, Benjamin Goodhue from Massachusetts, Elias Boudinot from New Jersey, and George Gale from Maryland.

The Committee of Eleven made a report to the House of Representatives on July 28, 1789, which was considered by the Committee of the Whole House. This resulted in the passage of seventeen proposed amendments on August 21, 1789, with two-thirds of the members present concurring. These House proposed amendments were then considered, modified and amended by the Senate on September 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9, 1789. On September 21, 1789, the House of Representatives agreed to certain of the Senate’s amendments and changes, but not to others, and requested a joint conference, which was agreed to by the Senate on the same date.

The joint conference committee included, from the House of Representatives, James Madison of Virginia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut and John Vining of Delaware. From the Senate, the committee members included Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut, Charles Carroll from Maryland and William Paterson from New Jersey. Such joint conference committee agreed to and reported out twelve recommended constitutional amendments. These twelve were agreed to by the House of Representatives on September 24, 1789, by a vote of 37 to 14. This was followed by the Senate passage and proposal of such Amendments on September 25, 1789.

Congress also passed a Resolution, which was approved by the House of Representatives on September 24, 1789, and by the Senate on September 26, 1789, requesting the President of the United States transmit the proposed Amendments to the States for ratification consideration. On October 2, 1789, President George Washington transmitted these proposed Amendments to the eleven member States (“Member States”), and to Rhode Island and South Carolina, States not then having ratified the Constitution.  Such letter read as follows:

United States October 2nd 1789

Sir,

        In pursuance of the enclosed resolution, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the amendments proposed to be added to the Constitution of the United States.

I have the honor to be
with this confederation
Your Excellency’s
      most obedient Servant,
      George Washington

Articles the third to the twelfth, the “Bill of Rights,” were ratified as Articles of Amendment I to X by the requisite number of States on December 15, 1791. Article the second was ratified as Article of Amendment XXVII by the requisite number of States on May 7, 1992, more then 200 hundred years after its proposal by Congress.

To date, as best determined, this proposed Amendment, “Article the first,” has been ratified by ten States, thirty-eight States now being necessary for Final Ratification — New Jersey, November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Pennsylvania, September 21, 1791; Vermont, November 3, 1791; and Virginia, November 3, 1791.

Background

As previously indicated, this proposed Amendment was “Article the first” of the first, proposed twelve Amendments with the other eleven being previously ratified as Articles of Amendment I to X and Article of Amendment XXVII. These twelve proposed Amendments, especially those involving individual rights and liberties, originated in the first Congress at the insistence and demand of many of the States. At that time, it was customary in America that guarantees of individual rights and liberties, a “Bill of Rights,” were to be spelled out in written format. Thus, when the constitutional Convention of 1787 was convened, there were requests and demands to include a “Bill of Rights” in the proposed Constitution. However, this did not then happen.

The Convention had been long and trying, and most of the members were weary, eager to complete their work. The consensus was that the proposed Constitution was a good document, a great improvement over the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union; and, although it was not perfect, it was finalized and submitted to the States for consideration. It was felt that deficiencies, such as the lack of a “Bill of Rights,” would be addressed by subsequent Amendment.

During the State ratification of the Constitution, a number of the States continued to be vocal advocates for a “Bill of Rights.” In some of the State conventions, the proposed Constitution was ratified, but it was specifically recommended that a “Bill of Rights” be added. When the Massachusetts convention ratified the Constitution on February 6, 1788, they recommended that amendments be made to the Constitution, which included nine specific provisions. Further, such convention instructed its future Representatives in Congress “to exert all their influence & use all reasonable & legal methods to obtain a ratification” of such recommended provisions.

Other States echoed this concern and, although not conditioning their ratifications upon it, strongly recommended the addition of individual rights and liberties. South Carolina’s ratification act on May 23, 1788, recommended modifications to the Constitution, which was followed by New Hampshire’s recommendation of twelve additional provisions in its ratification on June 21, 1788. On June 27, 1788, the day after its ratification of the Constitution, the Virginia Convention recommended a “Declaration or Bill of Rights,” which included twenty provisions, and also recommended twenty amendments to other provisions in the Constitution. New York, the eleventh ratifying State on July 26, 1788, ratified the Constitution with barely a majority (30 to 27) and included a list of prospective Amendments including a “Bill of Rights.”

North Carolina was the most adamant proponent for the inclusion of a “Bill of Rights” and refused to ratify the Constitution until a “Bill of Rights” was proposed. On August 2, 1788, in its first constitutional convention held from July 21 to August 4, 1788, North Carolina “Resolved” that a “declaration of rights”…“ought to be laid before Congress”,…“previous to the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid on the part of the state of North Carolina.” Further, twenty-six “Declaration of Rights” were included in their resolution. On November 21, 1789, and following the proposal of the first twelve Amendments by Congress on September 25, 1789, North Carolina finally ratified the Constitution.

Present Day Status

Upon proposal of this Amendment by Congress on September 25, 1789, and unlike most of the Amendments proposed by Congress in the twentieth century, Congress did not specify a time limit in which Final Ratification was to be accomplished. As such, this proposed Amendment continues to be subject to ratification by three-quarters of the States. In order for this to occur, twenty-eight additional State ratifications are necessary.

The subject matter of this proposed Amendment is about the number of Representatives in the House of Representatives and a calculation based on population as to which three tiers were indicated. The first tier was for a total population of the United States of three million or less and the second tier would have applied when the total population was more than three million but less then eight million people. Both of these tiers have long since been exceeded and are no longer applicable.

The third calculation tier would have been applicable when the total population exceeded eight million, which occurred in approximately 1814. The calculation methodology for the number of Representatives specified in the third tier is based upon the population and is to be determination by Congress, with certain restrictions. Specifically, “there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.”

The present method of calculating the number of Representatives has been determined by Congress and is very comparable to the third tier calculation. There are presently four-hundred and thirty-five members in the House of Representatives, which number was fixed by statute in 1929. Since that time, only the ratio of the number of persons per Representative has changed and, using the enumeration from the 2000 Census of 281 million people, there was one Representative for every 647,000 people.

It appears that any potential future ratification of this proposed Amendment is generally a non-issue as it appears to be in comparable and compatible with the 1929 statute and the present number of Representatives in Congress.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 33 – Article of Amendment XXVII
By David Robert Wood
May 1, 2012

 Article of Amendment XXVII reads as follows:

Article of Amendment XXVII

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

This proposed Amendment, “Article the second,” was included in the first twelve proposed Amendments, which included “Article the first,” as yet un-ratified, and “Article the third” to “Article the twelfth.” These latter ten, as discussed in a previously article, were ratified as Articles of Amendment I to X, or the “Bill of Rights.”

These twelve proposed Amendments were approved in Congress in slightly more than six months after its beginning under the newly ratified Constitution. Most of them involved individual rights and liberties, a “Bill of Rights,” which were sought at the insistence and demand of many of the States.

During the 1787 Constitutional Convention, there were requests and demands to include individual rights and liberties, but this didn’t happen. The Convention had been long and trying, and most of the members were weary and eager to complete their work and return to their homes. The consensus was that the proposed Constitution was a good document, a great improvement over the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and although not considered perfect, it was approved and submitted to the States for consideration. It was felt that any deficiencies, such as the lack of a “Bill of Rights,” should be addressed by subsequent amendment to it.

During the ratification of the Constitution, a number of the States continued to be vocal advocates for a “Bill of Rights.” In some of the State conventions, the proposed Constitution was ratified, but it was specifically recommended that a “Bill of Rights” be added. The Massachusetts convention ratified the Constitution on February 6, 1788 and they recommended that alterations be made to the Constitution, including nine specific provisions. Further, such convention enjoined its future Representatives in Congress “to exert all their influence & use all reasonable & legal methods to obtain a ratification” of such recommended provisions.

South Carolina’s ratification of the Constitution on May 23, 1788, also recommended modifications to the Constitution, which was followed by New Hampshire’s recommendation of twelve additional provisions in its ratification on June 21, 1788. On June 27, 1788, the day after its ratification of the Constitution, the Virginia convention recommended a “Declaration or Bill of Rights,” which included twenty provisions. On July 26, 1788, New York ratified the Constitution with barely a majority of thirty to twenty-seven, and they also included a list of prospective amendments to protect rights and liberties.

North Carolina was the most adamant proponent for the inclusion of a “Bill of Rights” and refused to ratify the Constitution until a “Bill of Rights” was proposed. On August 2, 1788, North Carolina “Resolved” in its convention that a “declaration of rights”…“ought to be laid before Congress”,…“previous to the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid on the part of the state of North Carolina,” which included twenty-six recommended “Declaration of Rights.” On November 21, 1789, following the proposal of the first twelve Amendments by Congress on September 25, 1789, North Carolina finally ratified the Constitution.

These first twelve proposed Amendments to Constitution were adopted by a simple Resolution, concurred to by both Houses of Congress, in the first session of the first Congress on September 25, 1789, when they passed the Senate, in amended form, by “Resolve” and without detailed voting information <AoAXXVII2>.

The process in proposing these first Amendments to the Constitution began on June 8, 1789. A motion was made and seconded in the House of Representatives that Congress should consider “certain specific amendments” to become part of the Constitution, which was then referred to the Committee of the Whole House. On July 21, 1789, the task for amending the Constitution was assigned to a committee comprised of one Representative from each State, eleven States having then ratified the Constitution. To be known as the “Committee of Eleven,” the members included John Vining from Delaware, James Madison from Virginia, Abraham Baldwin from Georgia, Roger Sherman from Connecticut, Aedanus Burke from South Carolina, Nicholas Gilman from New Hampshire, George Clymer from Pennsylvania, Egbert Benson from New York, Benjamin Goodhue from Massachusetts, Elias Boudinot from New Jersey, and George Gale from Maryland.

The Committee of Eleven made a report to the House of Representatives on July 28, 1789, which was considered by the Committee of the Whole House. This resulted in the passage of seventeen proposed amendments on August 21, 1789, with two thirds of the members present concurring. These House proposed amendments were then considered, modified and amended by the Senate on September 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9, 1789. On September 21, 1789, the House of Representatives agreed to certain of the Senate’s amendments and changes, but not to others, and requested a joint conference, which was agreed to by the Senate on the same date.

The joint conference committee included, from the House of Representatives, James Madison of Virginia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut and John Vining of Delaware. From the Senate, the committee members included Oliver Ellsworth from Connecticut, Charles Carroll from Maryland and William Paterson from New Jersey. Such joint conference committee agreed to and reported out twelve recommended constitutional amendments. These twelve were agreed to by the House of Representatives on September 24, 1789, by a vote of 37 to 14 <AoAXXVII1>. This was followed by the Senate passage and proposal of such Amendments on September 25, 1789.

Congress also passed a Resolution, which was approved by the House of Representatives on September 24, 1789, and by the Senate on September 26, 1789, requesting the President of the United States transmit the proposed Amendments to the States for ratification consideration. On October 2, 1789, President George Washington transmitted these proposed Amendments to the eleven member States (“Member States”), and to Rhode Island and South Carolina, States not then having ratified the Constitution <AoAXXVII3>.  Such letter read as follows: 

        United States October 2nd 1789

Sir,

       In pursuance of the enclosed resolution, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the amendments proposed to be added to the Constitution of the United States.

I have the honor to be
with this confederation
Your Excellency’s
       most obedient Servant,
       George Washington         

Ratification of Article of Amendment XXVII occurred on May 7, 1992, when Michigan and New Jersey became the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth States to ratify this Amendment, there then being fifty States in all.

Following is the detailed ratification by the thirty-nine States — Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873; Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine, April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, February 21, 1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee, May 23, 1985; Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986; Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah, February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 5, 1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13, 1987; Wisconsin, July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988; Louisiana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989; Nevada, April 26, 1989; Alaska, May 6, 1989; Oregon, May 19, 1989; Minnesota, May 22, 1989; Texas, May 25, 1989; Kansas, April 5, 1990; Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, March 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5, 1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992; and New Jersey, May 7, 1992.

Subsequent to Final Ratification, this Article of Amendment was ratified by two additional States — Illinois on May 12, 1992 and California on June 26, 1992. This Article of Amendment has not been ratified by Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington.

Article of Amendment XXVII was proclaimed and certified as ratified by the Archivist of the United States, Don W. Wilson, on May 18, 1992, listing forty ratifying States, which included Illinois <AoAXXVII4>.

Taking over two hundred years to ratify, this long-forgotten proposed and un-ratified Amendment, also known as the “Madison Amendment,” was rediscovered in 1982 by University of Texas student, Gregory Watson. He aggressively pushed for its passage by the remaining States, which became popular because of its subject matter, restricting “compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives.”  At that time, the Federal Government was generally unpopular and national interest in this dusty, proposed Amendment was renewed because of its subject. State ratification recommenced with Maine in 1983. Thereafter, another thirty States steadily ratified this Amendment over the next nine years, culminating in Final Ratification on May 7, 1992.

During this later ratification period, many opinions were expressed about the continued viability of this two hundred year old proposed Amendment. Congress was urged to act and several members of Congress expressed their concerns about the circumstances of ratification. Some legal analysts had suggested, citing the 1921 Supreme Court case of Dillon v. Gloss, that due to the passage of time, this proposed Amendment had long since “died.” Alternatively, it was also suggested that State ratification actions, of themselves, should be contemporaneous with each other. Thus, the first seven State ratifications, all more than one hundred years before, should be considered as not being contemporaneous and therefore ineffective, necessitating re-ratification by these States.

Others believed that once an Amendment has been proposed, Congress no longer has an on-going role in the constitutional amendment process.  As such, Congress may not evaluate the continued adequacy of State ratifications, whether recent or over a hundred years before.

Notwithstanding these views, Congress ultimately embraced the ratification of Article of Amendment XXVII, and there were accolades of praise as to the wisdom of the States in ratifying it. Given the subject matter of the Amendment, specifically restricting Congressional pay raises, few Representatives and Senators openly expressed doubts as to its validity, fearing that opposing it, on any grounds, would likely result in electorate repercussions.

Following the announcement of Final Ratification by the Archivist of the United States, the Senate adopted a Simple Resolution and a Concurrent Resolution on May 20, 1992, by a vote of 99 to 0, announcing that Article of Amendment XXVII “has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the United States.” On the same day, the House of Representatives also passed a Concurrent Resolution declaring that Article of Amendment XXVII had been ratified by a sufficient number of States. And, as with the Senate, such resolution was overwhelmingly approved by a vote of 414 to 3. Neither house of Congress subsequently acted upon the other’s Concurrent Resolution, but the affirmation was clear.

Impact of Article of Amendment XXVII on the Constitution and on Preceding Articles of Amendment

Article of Amendment XXVII is supplemental, or additive, to the original language in the Constitution and in preceding Articles of Amendment. This Artcle of Amendment is the last Article of Amendment ratified as of the date of this publication, and is the last article in the fourth section of this series, that being the “Ratified Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.”

The next section is the fifth and final section in the series and is about the “Forgotten, Un-ratified Amendments Proposed to the U.S. Constitution.” This section will include discussions on the six, un-ratified Amendments proposed by Congress.  Of these six, two have expired as a result of a failure to be ratified before the expiration of the prescribed time limit and four may still be ratified today.   The detailed discussions will be similar to the ratified Amendments, which includes data and information on these six, proposed Amendments to the Constitution.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 32 – Article of Amendment XXVI
By David Robert Wood
April 15, 2012

Article of Amendment XXVI reads as follows:

Article of Amendment XXVI

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

By 1920, as previously discussed relative to Article of Amendment XIX, suffrage, the right to vote, had been granted to all citizens of the United States without regard to religion, ethnicity, social status or gender, all being previous exclusions at various times in the history of the country. And, the typical voting age was twenty-one.

Attempts to reduce the voting age started in 1942, with the introduction of a resolution by US Congressman Jennings Randolph of West Virginia (he served in the House of Representatives from 1933 to 1947 and in the Senate from 1958 to 1985). During the next thirty years, more than one hundred and fifty similar measures were introduced, without successful passage. In the late 1960s, the final impetus to lower the voting age to eighteen was the escalation of the Vietnam War. Conscription was necessary to fill military ranks and young men eighteen years of age were being drafted. They argued that if they were old enough to die for their country, then they were certainly old enough to vote. This was a very persuasive and ultimately successful argument.

In 1970, in the ninety-first Congress, then Senator Randolph again introduced a resolution to amend the Constitution to lower the voting age to eighteen. He was finally successful, but not then in the way he had planned. Instead of a constitutional Amendment, Congress passed a statute to lower the voting age to eighteen. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was set to expire and was being discussed in Congress. After several days’ debate, a provision to lower the voting age to eighteen was approved and included in the extension and re-passage of this Act.

However, almost immediately, the Justice Department and several States questioned the constitutionality of this law, which culminated in the Supreme Court case of Oregon v. Mitchell. This case specifically involved the “Voting Rights Act” as amended in 1970, which provided the right to vote to eighteen-year-old citizens. In a five-to-four split decision on December 21, 1970, the Supreme Court ruled that the Voting Rights Act was acceptable for Federal elections but declared that the provisions granting suffrage to eighteen-year-olds was unconstitutional as to State and local elections.

At that time, only three of the fifty States had specifically granted suffrage to eighteen-year-olds. The Court’s ruling created a dual-voting system in the other forty-seven States where eighteen-year-olds were permitted to vote in Federal elections but not in State and local elections. It was believed that this dual voting system would create confusion and increase the possibility of fraudulent voting.  Further, it would be costly, requiring the implementation of new dual voting-age procedures and the replacement or modification of voting machinery. Because of this, there was significant increased interest in a constitutional Amendment, which culminated with Congress’ proposal of Article of Amendment XXVI on March 23, 1971. On July 1, 1971, a little over three months later, this proposed Amendment was fully ratified in the shortest ratification period for any Article of Amendment. Article of Amendment XXVI is the fourth (and, so far, the last) Amendment to overrule a Supreme Court case.

Article of Amendment XXVI was proposed in the first session of the ninety-second Congress by a Joint Resolution on March 23, 1971, when it passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 401 to 19 <AoAXXVI2>. It had previously passed the Senate on March 10, 1971, by a vote of 94 to 0 <AoAXXVI1>. This proposed Amendment was introduced in the Senate by Jennings Randolph from West Virginia, for himself and for eighty-three other Senators, on January 25, 1971.

On March 24, 1971, this proposed Amendment, “Article—,” was certified as proposed by the Director of the Federal Register, Fred J. Emery. On this same date, it was transmitted to the fifty States for ratification consideration by the Administrator of General Services, Robert L. Kunzig <AoAXXVI3>. Final Ratification occurred on July 1, 1971, when North Carolina and Oklahoma became the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth States to ratify this Amendment.

Following is the detailed ratification by the thirty-nine States — Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23, 1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Tennessee, March 23, 1971; Washington, March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts, March 24, 1971; Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30, 1971; Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April 3, 1971; Kansas, April 7, 1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April 8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8, 1971; Maine, April 9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California, April 19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971; Texas, April 27, 1971; South Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia, April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Arizona, May 14, 1971; Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4, 1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June 29, 1971; Alabama, June 30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina, July 1, 1971; and Oklahoma, July 1, 1971.

Subsequent to Final Ratification, this Article of Amendment was ratified by three additional States — Virginia on July 8, 1971; Wyoming on July 8, 1971; and Georgia on October 4, 1971. This Article of Amendment has not been ratified by Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota and Utah.

Article of Amendment XXVI was proclaimed and certified as ratified by the Administrator of General Services, Robert L. Kunzig on July 5, 1971, listing the thirty-nine ratifying States <AoAXXVI4>. In addition, and as was done relative to Articles of Amendment XXIV and XXV, President Richard Nixon also signed the Proclamation along with three members of the “Young Americans in Concert” Choir – Julianne Jones from Memphis, Tennessee; Joseph W. Loyd, Jr. from Detroit, Michigan; and Paul Larimer from Concord, California – with the following annotation:

The foregoing was signed in our presence on this 5th day of July, 1971

This specific language simply meant that the President and the other three persons were spectators to the issuance of such proclamation by the Administrator of General Services, and wished to record their presence by their signatures.

The proposal of this Amendment included a drop-dead provision in the congressional “Resolve.” Such provision prescribed a time limit in which full ratification was to be completed, which provision was nullified and no longer applicable upon the full and Final Ratification of this Article of Amendment on July 1, 1971. It would have otherwise expired, as would have this proposed Amendment, on March 23, 1978, seven years after the date transmitted to the States for their ratification consideration.

For Articles of Amendment XVIII, XX, XXI and XXII, the seven-year time limit to achieve full ratification was included in the text of the proposed Amendments. For Articles of Amendment XXIII to XXVI, and the un-ratified Amendment on “Equal Rights” proposed on March 22, 1972, Congress included the seven-year time limiting language in the “Resolve” proposing each of such Amendments. For the August 22, 1978, proposed Amendment on Representation in Congress for the District of Columbia, which proposed Amendment has expired, the seven-year time limiting language was included in both the text of the proposed Amendment and in the “Resolve” proposing it.

Impact of Article of Amendment XXVI on the Constitution and on Preceding Articles of Amendment

Article of Amendment XXVI is supplemental, or additive, to the original language in the Constitution and in preceding Articles of Amendment. Section 2 is a Congressional enforcement provision relative to Section 1.

Notwithstanding the above, this Article of Amendment has been incorrectly indicated in other publications as impacting Article of Amendment XIV, Section 2.  One of such presentations, being substantively erroneous, is as follows:

Article of Amendment XIV, Section 2

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
____________
Highlighted words were invalidated by Amendments XIX and XXVI.

As previously discussed, Article of Amendment XXVI granted the right to vote to eighteen year old or older citizens of the United States. Article of Amendment XIX, previously fully ratified on August 18, 1920, specified that the right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.  This provided women the same right to vote as was provided to men. 

Article of Amendment XIV, Section 2 is about Representative apportionment.  It also sets forth a penalty on the States in the event the right to vote is denied to certain persons.  These certain persons included “male inhabitants of such State being twenty-one years of age” and “citizens of the United States.” 

The granting of voting rights under Articles of Amendment XXVI does not impact this penalty.  The subject matters of Article of Amendment XXVI and Article of Amendment XIV, Section 2 are, at most, only incidentally, and not contextually, related. In order to eliminate or “invalidate” the above indicated terms, another constitutional Amendment would be required.  Such amendment would need to specifically eliminate the term “male,” and replace the term “twenty-one” with the term “eighteen.”

The above presentation incorrectly eliminates terms that should not otherwise be eliminated.  Further, after eliminating or “invalidating” such terms, the remaining Clause is significantly grammatically incorrect.  This presentation is unacceptable, misleading and, as previously noted, substantively erroneous.

Article of Amendment XXVI has not been impacted by subsequent Articles of Amendment.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 31 – Article of Amendment XXV
By David Robert Wood
April 1, 2012

 Article of Amendment XXV reads as follows:

Article of Amendment XXV

Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office

Background

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the original Constitution reads as follows:

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

As indicated, this clause provided for the succession of the President in the event of his or her death, resignation, removal or inability to perform the duties of the Office. It also provided that in the event of the death, resignation, removal or inability to perform the duties of the Office affected both the President and Vice President, that Congress shall specify the Officer who shall act as President.

This Clause was somewhat unclear concerning the Vice President’s actual capacity when he performed the duties of the Office of the President. Specifically, did the Vice President serve as an “acting” President or did he become the “official” President? This was an issue of controversy concerning President William Henry Harrison, who was the first President to die in office in 1841. Upon his death, his successor, John Tyler, ultimately took the oath of office and served as the official President, which Congress subsequently voted to recognize. This tradition of serving as the actual or official President continued relative to the next seven Presidents to die in office, the last being President John F. Kennedy in 1963.

There was also uncertainty under this clause regarding Presidential succession when the President was unable or incapable of discharging the duties of the Presidency due to an inability such as injury or a prolonged illness. In 1881, President James A. Garfield was the victim of an assassin’s bullet. Before his death, the President lingered for over two months during which time he was mostly incapable of performing his duties. Other Presidents who have suffered from injury or illness that probably rendered them less than fully capable of performing the duties of the Office have included Woodrow Wilson, who suffered a severe stroke in 1919, over a year before the end of his term; Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had had three serious illnesses from 1955 to 1960; and Ronald Reagan, who was severely wounded in an assassination attempt in 1981.

With respect to Presidents Garfield and Wilson, no actions were taken during the periods of Presidential inability. President Eisenhower had an informal arrangement whereby the Vice President acted on his behalf. President Reagan’s inability occurred subsequent to the Final Ratification of Article of Amendment XXV and he elected not to invoke the provisions in Section 3 of Article of Amendment XXV. Instead, Reagan accommodated that short period of his inability, when he underwent surgery and was under anesthesia, by written notice to the leaders of Congress.  In such correspondence, he notified them that the Presidential duties for such period were to be performed by the Vice President.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 was also significantly deficient in that it failed to provide for the succession of the Vice President in the case of his or her death, resignation or removal from office. Prior to Article of Amendment XXV, there have been sixteen incidents when the office of the Vice President was vacant. Fortunately, none of these occurred at the same time as the death or incapacitation of a President.

The lack of a Vice President’s succession in the Constitution was the primary motivator to Congress’ 1965 proposal of Article of Amendment XXV. Only two years before, President John F. Kennedy had been assassinated and Vice President Lyndon Johnson was immediately sworn in as President. He served the remaining Kennedy term of more than a year without a Vice President being in office. This could have been a significant issue in that President Johnson’s health was somewhat questionable as he had suffered a serious heart attack eight years earlier. Had President Johnson succumbed, there would have been no Vice President to succeed him, with constitutional chaos being the possible result.

This deficiency was addressed by Article of Amendment XXV, which also modified the Presidential succession provisions as included in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution.

Article of Amendment XXV was proposed in the first session of the eighty-ninth Congress by a Joint Resolution on July 6, 1965, when it passed the Senate in amended form by a vote of 68 to 5 <AoAXXV2>, as reported out of a joint conference committee. This proposed Amendment was introduced in the Senate on January 6, 1965, by Birch E. Bayh of Indiana, for himself and for sixty-eight other Senators. It was originally passed by the Senate on February 19, 1965, by a vote of 72 to 0. The House of Representatives then amended and passed it on April 13, 1965, by a vote of 368 to 29. On April 22, 1965, the Senate, disagreeing with the House of Representatives amendment to it, requested a joint conference, which was agreed to by the House of Representatives on the April 28, 1965.

The joint conference committee included Senators Birch E. Bayh from Indiana, James O. Eastland from Mississippi, Sam J. Ervin, Jr. from North Carolina, Everett M. Dirksen from Illinois and Roman L. Hruska from Nebraska. House of Representative members included Emanuel Celler from New Mexico, Byron G. Rogers from Colorado, James C. Corman from California, William M. McCulloch from Ohio and Richard H. Poff from Virginia. The House of Representatives first agreed to the joint conference committee report on June 30, 1965, with two thirds voting in the affirmation <AoAXXV1> before final passage and proposal by the Senate.

On July 8, 1965, this proposed Amendment, “Article—,” was certified as proposed by the Archivist of the United States, Wayne C. Grover. It was transmitted to the fifty States for ratification consideration on July 9, 1965, by the Administrator of General Services, Lawson B. Knott, Jr. <AoAXXV3> Ratification occurred on February 10, 1967, when Minnesota and Nevada became the thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth States to ratify this Amendment.

Following is the detailed ratification by the thirty-eight States —Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13, 1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August 9, 1965; Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona, September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20, 1965; California, October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17, 1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico, February 3, 1966; Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966; Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966; Hawaii, March 3, 1966; Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March 14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New Hampshire, June 13, 1966; Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January 12, 1967; Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Washington, January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10, 1967; and Nevada, February 10, 1967.

Subsequent to Final Ratification, this Article of Amendment was ratified by nine additional States, which included Connecticut, February 14, 1967; Montana, February 15, 1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio, March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North Carolina, March 22, 1967; Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; and Florida, May 25, 1967. This Article of Amendment has not been ratified by Georgia, North Dakota and South Carolina.

Article of Amendment XXV was proclaimed and certified as ratified by the Administrator of General Services, Lawson B. Knott, Jr. on February 23, 1967, listing thirty-nine ratifying States, which included Montana <AoAXXV4>. In addition, and as was done for the first time relative to Article of Amendment XXIV, President Lyndon Johnson also signed the proclamation with the following annotation:

The foregoing was signed in my presence on this
23rd day of February 1967.

This specific language simply meant that the President was a spectator to the issuance of such proclamation by Administrator of General Services, and wished to record his presence by his signature.

The proposal of this Amendment included a drop-dead provision in the congressional “Resolve.” Such provision prescribed a time limit in which full ratification was to be completed, which provision was nullified and no longer applicable upon the full and Final Ratification of this Article of Amendment on February 10, 1967. It would have otherwise expired, as would have this proposed Amendment, on July 8, 1972, seven years after the date transmitted to the States for their ratification consideration.

For Articles of Amendment XVIII, XX, XXI and XXII, the seven-year time limit to achieve full ratification was included in the text of the proposed Amendments. For Articles of Amendment XXIII to XXVI, and the un-ratified Amendment on “Equal Rights” proposed on March 22, 1972, Congress included the seven-year time limiting language in the “Resolve” proposing each of such Amendments. For the August 22, 1978, proposed Amendment on Representation in Congress for the District of Columbia, which proposed Amendment has expired, the seven-year time limiting language was included in both the text of the proposed Amendment and in the “Resolve” proposing it.

Impact of Article of Amendment XXV on the Constitution and on Preceding Articles of Amendment

Article of Amendment XXV, Section 1 superseded certain phrases in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution. Sections 2, 3 and 4 are supplemental, or additive, to the original language in the Constitution and in preceding Articles of Amendment.

A preferred presentation of the impact of Article of Amendment XXV, Section 1 on Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution is as follows:

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution

In Case [of the Removal]⁽¹⁾ of the President [from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or]⁽¹⁾ Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
____________
(1) Superseded by Article of Amendment XXV, Section 1.

This presentation includes other presentations that highlight the same phrases in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 and that use a general but comparatively descriptive footnote.

There are two basic subject matters in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution. The first is Presidential succession in the event of the “Removal,” “Death,” “Resignation” or “Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties” of the President. The second subject matter is a provision allowing Congress to provide “for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability” of both the President and Vice President. This second subject was not addressed or impacted by Article of Amendment XXV.

Article of Amendment XXV, Section 1 sets forth the Presidential succession in the event of the “removal,” “death” or “resignation” of the President. This is also part of the Presidential succession subject matter in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, which language was superseded by Article of Amendment XXV.

Sections 3 and 4 of Article of Amendment XXV discuss Presidential succession when the President is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” as determined by either the President (Section 3) or the Vice President and a majority of certain other persons (Section 4). This phrase, “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” is very similar to the phrase, “Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said office” in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6. However, the determination of an inability is not indicated in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 whereas it is indicated in Article of Amendment XXV. Specifically, Section 3 discussed the determination by the President himself and Section 4 discusses determination by the Vice President and other persons therein defined.

There is a reasonable, although unlikely, potential that a President’s “Inability” to serve may be determined in a manner other than by the President himself or by the Vice President and other persons therein defined. At most, Article of Amendment XXV, Sections 3 and 4 may be considered to either limit or augment the Presidential succession in the event of the President’s “Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of said office.”  As such, the above presentation retains the “Inability” language in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6.  Note also that this Clause 6 and Article of Amendment XXV, Sections 3 and 4 both state the Vice President shall succeed the President.

After deleting the terms and phrases indicated above, the first phrase reads: “In Case of the President Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President…” Although not quite grammatically correct, “President” should be “President’s,” this is a reasonable presentation not otherwise needing modification. Upon eliminating the superseded phrases, Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution reads as follows:

In Case of the President Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

In other books and publications, the impact of Article of Amendment XXV has been incorrectly indicated as follows:

Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.⁽¹⁾
____________
(1)   Superseded by Article of Amendment XXV, Section 1.

As previously discussed, Article of Amendment XXV did not impact the phrase “and the Congress may… or a President shall be elected,” the second part of the aforementioned Clause 6.  Further, the “Inability” provision remains potentially applicable and should not be considered as superseded or replaced.

As such, the above presentation incorrectly eliminates constitutional language that is still in effect and that should not be eliminated. It is a substantively erroneous presentation.

Article of Amendment XXV has not been directly impacted by subsequent Articles of Amendment.

About Our Constitution, a Series

Article 30 – Article of Amendment XXIV
By David Robert Wood
March 15, 2012

Article of Amendment XXIV reads as follows:

Article of Amendment XXIV

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other tax.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

By 1920, as discussed relative to Article of Amendment XIX, suffrage, the right to vote, had been granted to all citizens of the United States without regard to religion, ethnicity, social status and sex, all being former exclusions at various times in the nation’s history. Although States could not discriminate, many had poll taxes, also known as “per capita taxes,” “capitation taxes” and “head taxes.” A poll tax was nothing more than a fee for the privilege of voting, charged by a State or municipality within a State.

Poll taxes became more common following the Civil War and were used by some of the States in a discriminatory manner in denying the vote to various persons, especially former slaves. Such discrimination, favoring one group over another, was found to be illegal and un-constitutional. However, as a whole, poll taxes were considered appropriate so long as such taxes were equally applied and did not otherwise discriminate.

Nonetheless and by their nature, charging a fee to vote was at least morally discriminatory, especially impacting poorer individuals, many of whom were members of racial minorities. In 1960, it was reported that there were five States that required poll taxes in order to vote in the Presidential election of that year. Further, and prior to 1962, there had been few successful efforts made to abolish such poll taxes. The consensus was that it was a State’s right to impose poll taxes, so long as they were nondiscriminatory.

During this same timeframe, the Civil Rights Movement was underway and was shaping public opinion. Among other things, the movement objected to poll taxes as being unfair and this shift in public sentiment was certainly helpful in abolishing poll taxes.  However, the ultimate abolition of poll taxes and the proposal of Article of Amendment XXIV can best be credited to one person, that being Senator Spessard L. Holland of Florida.

Senator Holland was first elected to the U.S. Senate on November 5, 1946. During the 1930s, he had been a Florida State Senator and was successful in repealing the poll tax in Florida. In 1947, immediately following his seating in Congress, Holland introduced a measure to abolish poll taxes. It was unsuccessful, as were his next five attempts.

In the 1962, eighty-seventh Congress, Senator Holland succeeded by savvy political maneuvering, or, if you will, trickery.  In March 1962, a bill to make the home of Alexander Hamilton a national monument (S.J. Res. 29) was introduced through the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Upon the bill’s presentation to the Senate floor and in accordance with the rules of the Senate, Holland offered an amendment, that being that the rights of citizens to vote should not be denied for failure to pay a poll tax. Following a filibuster and lengthy debate, Senator Holland’s offered amendment was substituted for the original proposed language, thus completely eliminating the original subject of a national monument for Alexander Hamilton. This substituted language became Article of Amendment XXIV.

Article of Amendment XXIV was proposed in the second session of the eighty-seventh Congress by a Joint Resolution on August 27, 1962, when it passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 295 to 86, with 1 answering present <AoAXXIV3>. It had previously passed the Senate on March 27, 1962, by a vote of 77 to 16 <AoAXXIV2>. This proposed Amendment was originally introduced in the Senate by Jacob Javits from New York, for himself and Kenneth B. Keating, also of New York, on January 13, 1961. As previously discussed, such originally introduced Joint Resolution was not an amendment to the Constitution, but instead was to establish the former house of Alexander Hamilton as a national monument <AoAXXIV1>.

On September 7, 1962, this proposed Amendment, “Article—,” was certified as proposed by Archivist of the United States Wayne C. Grover. It was then transmitted to the fifty States for ratification consideration on September 14, 1962, by Administrator of General Services Bernard L. Boutin <AoAXXIV4>. Final Ratification occurred on January 23, 1964, when South Dakota became the thirty-eighth State to ratify this proposed Amendment, there then being fifty States in all.

Following is the detailed ratification by the thirty-eight States —Illinois, November 14, 1962; New Jersey, December 3, 1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Montana, January 28, 1963; West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963; Maryland, February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska, February 11, 1963; Rhode Island, February 14, 1963; Indiana, February 19, 1963; Utah, February 20, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963; Colorado, February 21, 1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963; Minnesota, February 27, 1963; New Mexico, March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963; North Dakota, March 7, 1963; Idaho, March 8, 1963; Washington, March 14, 1963; Vermont, March 15, 1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Connecticut, March 20, 1963; Tennessee, March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963; Wisconsin, March 26, 1963; Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March 28, 1963; Nebraska, April 4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April 24, 1963; Delaware, May 1, 1963; Missouri, May 13, 1963; New Hampshire, June 12, 1963; Kentucky, June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964; and South Dakota, January 23, 1964.

Subsequent to Final Ratification, this Article of Amendment was ratified by two additional States, Virginia on February 25, 1977, and North Carolina on May 3, 1989. This Article of Amendment has not been ratified by Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi (rejected on December 20, 1962), Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and Wyoming.

Article of Amendment XXIV was proclaimed and certified as ratified by Administrator of General Services Bernard L. Boutin on February 4, 1964, listing the thirty-eight ratifying States <AoAXXIV5>.

Interestingly, President Lyndon Johnson, at his request, signed the General Services Administration certification of ratification proclaiming the Final Ratification of this Article of Amendment. In doing so, President Johnson was advised that he should not use any words indicating “approval” and that it would not be proper for the President to “proclaim.” As such, the President signed the certification with the following annotation:

The foregoing was signed in my presence on this
4^th day of February, 1964.

This specific language was designed to mean “simply that the President was a spectator to the formalities of the Administrator [of General Services], and wished to record his presence by his signature on the certificate.”

The proposal of this Amendment included a drop-dead provision in the congressional “Resolve.” Such provision prescribed a time limit in which full ratification was to be completed, which provision was nullified and no longer applicable upon the full and Final Ratification of this Article of Amendment on January 23, 1964. It would have otherwise expired, as would have this proposed Amendment, on September 13, 1969, seven years after the date transmitted to the States for their ratification consideration.

For Articles of Amendment XVIII, XX, XXI and XXII, the seven-year time limit to achieve full ratification was included in the text of the proposed Amendments. For Articles of Amendment XXIII to XXVI, and the un-ratified Amendment on “Equal Rights” proposed on March 22, 1972, Congress included the seven-year time limiting language in the “Resolve” proposing each of such Amendments. For the August 22, 1978, proposed Amendment on Representation in Congress for the District of Columbia, which proposed Amendment has expired, the seven-year time limiting language was included in both the text of the proposed Amendment and in the “Resolve” proposing it.

Impact of Article of Amendment XXIV on the Constitution and on Preceding Articles of Amendment

Article of Amendment XXIV is supplemental, or additive, to the original language in the Constitution and in preceding Articles of Amendment. Section 2 is a congressional enforcement provision relative to Section 1.

This Article of Amendment has not been impacted by subsequent Articles of Amendment.